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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANNIE HARRISON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FREE SPIRIT RECREATION, 
INC., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
District Court No. 950901694 
Court of Appeals No. 950706-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether the trial court correctly determined as a matter of law that 
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement signed by 
Appellant operated as a complete bar against the claims brought by 
Appellant against Appellee. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
When determining whether a trial court properly granted a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the appellate court accepts the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and considers them and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, and the 
appellate court gives the trial court's ruling no deference and reviews it 
under a correctness standard. Prows v. State. 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); 
St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 
1991); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); Wright 
v. Univ. of Utah. 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 841 P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
B. Standard of Review for the Interpretation of a Contract 
The interpretation of a written contract is a question of law 
determined by the words of the agreement. Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-
2 
Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In construing a 
contract, the trial court must give effect to the intentions of the parties, 
and where possible, the intentions of the parties should be derived from an 
examination of the text of the contract. kL In other words, the court 
must first look to the four corners of the document to determine the intent 
of the parties. Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp.. 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). When interpreting a 
contract, the court looks at the contract as a whole to determine the 
parties' intent, and will accord common, accepted meanings to the words 
and phrases whenever possible. Gordon v. CRS Consulting Eng'g. Inc.. 
820 P.2d 492 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). If the court concludes that a contract 
is ambiguous from its text, extrinsic evidence should be considered by the 
trial court to ascertain the parties' intent. kL; Kimball v. Campbell. 699 
P.2d 714 (Utah 1985). 
If a trial court interprets a contract without considering extrinsic 
evidence, its decision will be accorded no particular weight and will be 
reviewed under a correctness standard. Kimball. 699 P.2d 714. If the 
contract is ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to consider extrinsic 
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evidence respecting the intentions of the parties, then the appellate court 
review is strictly limited. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 12(b)(6) 01 the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) is 
attached in Addendum as Exhibit "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arose from an injury allegedly sustained as the result of the 
participation of Plaintiff and Appellant, Jeannie Harrison ("Harrison"), in 
shock cord jumping (commonly referred to as "bungee jumping") at a 
shock cord tower operated by Defendant and Appellee, Free Spirit 
Recreation, Inc. ("Free Spirit"), on July 21, 1994. (Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 1; R. 17). The subject shock 
cord jumping facility is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (Jd.). 
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II. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE 
TRIAL COURT 
On or about March 8, 1995, Harrison filed her Complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 950901694 PI. (Complaint at 3; 
R. 3). On or about April 10, 1995, Free Spirit filed its Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs Complaint and Memorandum in Support of Motion. (Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at 2; R. 16; Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss at 7; R. 23). On or about April 20, 1995, Harrison 
filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
(Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4; R. 
31). On or about May 10, 1995, Free Spirit filed its Reply Memorandum. 
(Reply Memorandum at 10; R. 44). 
The trial court ruled that Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss should be 
granted. (Minute Entry at 1, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "B"; R. 
51; Order at 2, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "C"; R. 58-59). The 
trial court ruled that the Release of Liability Agreement signed by 
Harrison operated as a bar to Harrison's claim against Free Spirit. (Id-)-
This appeal followed. (Notice of Appeal; R. 61-62). 
5 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose as the result of an injury allegedly 
sustained by Harrison while participating in bungee jumping at a bungee 
jumping tower operated by Free Spirit, located in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. (Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 
1; R. 17). The incident occurred on July 21, 1994. (Id.). 
2. On or about March 8, 1995, Harrison filed a Complaint 
for injuries arising out of the bungee jumping occurrence of July 21, 1994. 
(Complaint at 3; R. 3). The case was assigned to the Honorable Sandra 
N. Peuler of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Civil No. 950901694. (Id. at 1-3; R. 1-3). 
3. In her Complaint, Harrison alleged against Free Spirit 
that its employee improperly instructed her on where to put her hands 
during the jump, and, as a result, she received permanent damage to her 
finger. (Complaint at 1-2; R. 1-2). Harrison did not plead a cause of 
action for willful and wanton misconduct or gross negligence against Free 
Spirit. (Id. at 1-3; R. 1-3). 
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4. Prior to participating in bungee jumping on the date of 
the alleged injury, Harrison signed an agreement entitled "Assumption of 
Risk and Release of Liability." (Assumption of Risk and Release of 
Liability, attached in Addendum as Exhibit "D"; R. 25). Harrison signed 
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement on the line 
identified as applicant's signature, and initialled the Agreement in seven 
other spaces on the Agreement. (Id-, Exhibit "D"). 
5. Free Spirit filed its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Complaint on April 10, 1995. (Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint at 
2; R. 15-16; Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 7; R. 17-
23). Free Spirit argued that under the law, a patron who signs an 
agreement exempting a recreational or amusement facility from liability for 
negligence will be bound by that agreement and cannot thereafter recover 
for personal injuries sustained while participating in the amusement or 
recreational activity. (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2-
7; R. 18-23). On or about April 20, 1995, Harrison filed her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Free 
Spirit subsequently filed its Reply Memorandum. (Memorandum in 
7 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4; R. 31; Reply 
Memorandum at 10; R. 44). 
6. After reviewing the pleadings, Judge Peuler ruled that 
Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss should be granted. (Minute Entry at 1, 
Exhibit "B"; R. 51; Order at 1-2, Exhibit "C"; R. 58-59). The trial court 
ruled that the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement 
signed by Harrison operated as a complete bar to Harrison's claim against 
Free Spirit. (Id.). Harrison appeals from that ruling. (Notice of Appeal; 
R. 61-62 ). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Judicial authority has held that release of liability agreements 
entered into by patrons of recreational facilities are valid and enforceable. 
The law in Utah is consistent in providing that one may contract to protect 
himself against losses sustained by his own negligence. The trial court 
correctly concluded upon an examination of the words of the Assumption 
of Risk and Release of Liability Agreement that it clearly and 
unambiguously operates as a complete bar to Harrison's claim of injuries 
sustained during the bungee jumping activity. 
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II. Harrison incorrectly asserts that the trial court's dismissal of 
her action was premature and that she should be able to conduct discovery. 
A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint 
but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those facts. Because 
the trial court accepted the allegations in Harrison's Complaint as true, 
there is no need to conduct further discovery to test the truthfulness of the 
allegations. 
In addition, the interpretation of the Release Agreement is a question 
of law to be determined by the words of the Agreement. The trial court 
considered the pleadings and determined from the four corners of the 
Agreement that it precluded Harrison from bringing an action. 
Furthermore, Harrison is not entitled to conduct discovery on the 
application of governmental standards or whether Free Spirit employees 
acted with willful and wanton negligence because these allegations were 
not pled in the Complaint, and further, the Plaintiff cannot support any 
such allegations in light of the facts alleged in the Complaint. Harrison 
cannot save her Complaint from being dismissed through speculative 
9 
allegations that are neither alleged in the Complaint nor supported by the 
facts. 
III. The alleged negligence of Free Spirit's employees and the 
injury to Harrison's hands are hazards encompassed within the purview of 
the Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability signed by Harrison. The 
language of the Release Agreement at issue in the present case could not 
be more clear: It releases Free Spirit from liability for negligence of its 
employees and for any and all injuries and damages suffered by Harrison 
as a result of her participation in bungee jumping. In order for the 
Release Agreement to be enforceable, it is not necessary that the releasing 
party have specific knowledge of every injury that may occur from the 
activity, or every means by which the injury may occur. Because 
Harrison agreed to assume the risk of all injury however caused, and 
agreed to release Free Spirit from any and all injury even if it resulted 
through the negligence of Free Spirit's employees, the Release Agreement 
operates as a complete bar to Harrison's claims against Free Spirit. 
IV. Judicial Authority has held that agreements releasing one from 
his or her negligence are not unconscionable. The intent to release Free 
10 
Spirit from liability is clearly expressed and easily comprehended, and 
Harrison's multiple signatures on the Agreement indicate she carefully 
read and comprehended the Agreement before signing it. There is no 
evidence that Harrison was induced into signing the Agreement in an 
unconscionable manner or that the Agreement is otherwise invalid. 
Bungee jumping does not involve an essential activity where Harrison had 
no alternative but to participate. Contrary to Harrison's argments, the 
Agreement is valid, and the trial court correctly determined that the 
Agreement bars Harrison's claims against Free Spirit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY 
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY HARRISON OPERATED AS 
A COMPLETE BAR TO HARRISON'S CLAIM OF 
INJURY AGAINST FREE SPIRIT. 
Prior to engaging in the bungee jumping activity that gave rise to the 
present suit, Harrison signed an agreement entitled "Assumption of Risk 
and Release of Liability." Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability, 
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. This Agreement provides in part as follows: 
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I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping (commonly 
referred to as "Bungee Jumping") is a hazardous activity 
and I am voluntarily participating in this activity with full 
knowledge of the danger involved and hereby agree to 
accept any and all risk of injury or death. 
Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The Agreement further states: 
As lawful consideration for being permitted by Free 
Spirit Recreation to participate in these activities and rent 
their equipment, I hereby agree that I, my heirs, 
distributes, guardians, legal representatives, and assigned 
shall not make a claim against, sue, attach the property 
of, or prosecute Free Spirit Recreation for injury or 
damage resulting from the negligence or other acts 
however caused by any employees, agent, or contractor 
of Free Spirit Recreation as a result of my participation 
in shock cord jumping. In addition, I hereby release and 
discharge the company from all actions, claims, or 
demands that I, my heirs, distributes, guardians, legal 
representatives, or assigned now have or may here after 
have for injury or damage resulting from my 
participation in shock cord jumping activities. 
Id. Exhibit "D"; R. 25. 
Judicial authority has held that a patron who signs an 
agreement exempting a recreational or amusement facility from 
liability for negligence will be bound by that agreement and cannot 
thereafter recover for personal injuries sustained while participating 
in the amusement or recreational activity. The law in Utah has long 
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held that "one may contract to protect himself against liability for 
loss caused by his negligence." Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First 
Sec. Corp.. 341 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah 1959); Freund v. Utah Power 
& Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990); Healev v. J.B. Sheet 
Metal. Inc.. 892 P.2d 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The Washington 
State Court of Appeals recently held that a release of liability 
contract entered into by the injured party bars that party from 
recovery against defendant for personal injuries or death allegedly 
caused by the negligence of the defendant. Boyce v. West. 862 P.2d 
592 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). The Boyce case involved a wrongful 
death action brought by the plaintiff on behalf of her son who died 
during a scuba diving accident while taking scuba lessons.1 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that "agreements 
absolving participants and proprietors from negligence liability 
i See also Hewitt v. Miller. 521 P.2d 244, 248 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1974) (This case also involved an action against scuba diving instructors 
for the death of a scuba diving student who signed a release of liability in 
favor of the instructors. The court held: "Based upon the undisputed 
facts in the record and upon our review of the law of this state, we hold 
that the release in question is valid and therefore the trial court correctly 
determined that it operates as a complete bar to appellant's lawsuit based 
upon allegations of negligence.") 
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during hazardous recreational activities are enforceable . . . ." 
Schutkowski v. Carev. 725 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 1986); see also 
Milligan v. Big Vallev Corp. 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988). In 
Schutkowski v. Carev. the plaintiff, a sky diving student, filed a 
complaint against her sky diving instructors for injuries she allegedly 
sustained during her first sky diving jump. Plaintiffs complaint 
alleged that the sky diving instructors were negligent in failing to 
adequately instruct plaintiff on proper sky diving procedures. 
The trial court in Carey found that a "Release and Indemnity 
Agreement" signed by plaintiff excused the instructors. Carey, at 
1062. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary 
judgment based on the release agreement, and the Wyoming 
Supreme Court affirmed. In arriving at its decision, the Wyoming 
Court referred to an Ohio state court opinion which reads as follows: 
"A participant in recreational activity is free to contract with the 
proprietor of such activity so as to relieve the proprietor of 
responsibility for damages or injuries to the participant caused by the 
negligence of the proprietor . . . ." Id. at 1060 (quoting Cain v. 
14 
Cleveland Parachute Training Center. 457 N.E.2d 1185, 1187 (Ohio 
1983)). 
Many jurisdictions from around the country have taken the 
same position as the Wyoming and Washington courts with respect 
to the enforceability of release of liability agreements as applied to 
recreational activities. Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises. 199 
N.E.2d 280 (111. 1964); Lee v. Allied Sports Associates. Inc.. 209 
A.2d 329 (Mass. 1965); Moss v. Fortune. 340 S.W.2d 902 (Tenn. 
1960); Leev. Sun Vallev Co.. 695 P.2d 361 (Idaho 1984); Jones v. 
Dressel. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981); Skotak v. Vic Tannv Int'l. 
Inc.. 513 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); LaFrenz v. Lake 
County Fair Bd.. 360 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977); DeBoer v. 
Florida Offroaders Driver's Ass'n. Inc.. 622 So.2d 1134 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993); Szczotka v. Snowridge. Inc.. 869 F. Supp 247 (D. 
VT. 1994) (interpreting Vermont state law); Bertotti v. Charlotte 
Motor Speedway. 893 F. Supp. 565 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (interpreting 
North Carolina state law); Haines v. St. Charles Speedway. Inc.. 
874 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1989) (interpreting Missouri state law). 
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In this case, the Release Agreement signed by Harrison clearly 
and unambiguously releases Free Spirit from any liability as a result 
of Harrison's participation in the bungee jumping activity, including 
injuries resulting from Free Spirit's alleged negligence. In addition 
to signing the Release Agreement on the line identified as applicant's 
signature, Harrison initialled the agreement in seven other spaces on 
the Agreement. Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability, 
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The Release Agreement clearly demonstrates 
that Harrison had a fair opportunity to review its contents and 
carefully consider the risks she was assuming before signing the 
document and participating in the bungee jump. 
The trial court found from its examination of the four corners 
of the Agreement that the parties intended to release Free Spirit from 
liability for Plaintiff's injuries. Based on the facts of this case and 
the governing legal authority, the trial court correctly interpreted the 
Release Agreement entered into by Harrison to operate as a complete 
bar to Harrison's claim against Free Spirit. 
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II. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE RELEASE AGREEMENT 
IS A LEGAL QUESTION DECIDED BY AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE DOCUMENT. 
In bringing this appeal, Harrison argues that Free Spirit's 
Motion to Dismiss was premature and that she should be able to 
obtain discovery showing that the actions of Free Spirit's employees 
and the injury she received fall outside the purview of the Release 
Agreement. Brief of Appellant at 4. The Utah Supreme Court has 
explained Rule 12(b)(6) as follows: "A rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the 
plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts." St. Benedict's Dev. 
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). As 
the trial court had to accept all facts in the Complaint as being true, 
there is no need to conduct discovery to test the truthfulness of the 
allegations. 
Free Spirit brought its Motion to Dismiss on the basis that, 
even if Harrison's allegations were accepted as true, the Release 
Agreement entered into by Harrison operates as a complete bar to 
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her claims for relief. The question of whether Harrison is prohibited 
from recovery pursuant to the Release Agreement is a legal question. 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming held as follows: "Exculpatory 
agreements, also referred to as releases, are contractual in nature. 
Interpretation and construction of contractual agreements are 
questions of law for the court to decide." Milligan v. Big Valley 
Corp.. 754 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Wyo. 1988) (citations omitted); Jones 
v. Dressel. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981). The Utah Supreme Court 
has consistently held that the interpretation of a written contract is a 
question of law determined by the words of the agreement. Kimball 
v. Campbell. 699 P.2d 714 (Utah 1985); Republic Group. Inc. v. 
Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Accordingly, the trial judge considered the pleadings and determined 
as a matter of law that the Release Agreement was unambiguous and 
that it evidenced an intent of the parties to operate as a bar to 
Harrison's claims against Free Spirit. Minute Entry at 1, Exhibit 
"B"; R. 51. In her Complaint, Harrison failed to allege any factual 
18 
scenario under which she would be able to prevail against Free 
Spirit, therefore the trial court's ruling was proper. 
Harrison also argues on appeal that whether Free Spirit's 
bungee jumping facility and equipment met governmental standards 
is a question that requires further discovery. Brief of Appellant at 4. 
Harrison then acknowledges that violation of governmental standards 
was not pled, purportedly because of lack of information, and asserts 
that she is entitled to discovery to determine if any such regulations 
were in fact violated. Id. These arguments, however, are 
insufficient to vacate the dismissal of Harrison's complaint. 
Harrison did not allege in her Complaint that the bungee cord was in 
violation of any governmental standards, nor did she name the 
governmental standards that may have been violated. Complaint 1-3; 
R. 1-3. Furthermore, Harrison has no support that a governmental 
regulation would set the standard of care, or that the violation of a 
statute or regulation would operate to void a release of liability 
agreement. Harrison's arguments are nothing more than speculation 
and conjecture asserted to save the Complaint from dismissal. 
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The courts have consistently held that a plaintiff cannot save a 
complaint from dismissal "by merely restating the conclusory 
allegations contained in his complaint, and amplifying them only 
with speculation about what discovery might uncover." Bryant v. 
O'Connor. 848 F.2d 1064, 1067 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Contemporary Mission. Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv.. 648 F.2d 97, 107 
(2d Cir. 1981)). Harrison's speculative allegations must also fail on 
appeal. 
In addition, Harrison seeks to circumvent the effect of the 
Release Agreement by claiming that the Agreement does not bar a 
claim based on gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct 
on the part of Free Spirit's employee. Brief of Appellant at 7-8. 
Harrison argues that many of the cases cited by Free Spirit in its 
memoranda in support of its Motion to Dismiss "conditioned the 
imposition of the release 'subject to willful misconduct limitations.'" 
Brief of Appellant at 8. In other words, willful or wanton 
misconduct by the defendant's employees renders a release of 
liability invalid. 
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This argument is immaterial in the present case because 
Harrison did not allege in her Complaint that Free Spirit's conduct 
was willful or wanton. Complaint 1-3; R. 1-3. Harrison merely 
asserted in her Complaint that the instruction from Free Spirit's 
employee on where to hold her hands was improper. Id. Because 
willful and wanton misconduct was never pled, Harrison can not 
make those speculative allegations on appeal to reverse the decision 
of the trial court. 
Furthermore, Harrison cannot support a claim of willful and 
wanton misconduct in light of the facts alleged in her Complaint. 
Harrison alleges in her Complaint that when she asked a Free Spirit 
employee where to place her hands during the bungee jumping 
activity, that she was improperly instructed on where to place her 
hands during the jump. Complaint 1-3; R. 1-3. Even assuming the 
truthfulness of these allegations, this alleged wrongful conduct does 
not rise to the level of willful or wanton. Harrison may not now 
attempt to bolster her Complaint with speculative allegations in order 
to vacate the dismissal of her Complaint. 
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III. 
THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF FREE SPIRIT'S 
EMPLOYEES AND THE INJURY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
HANDS ARE HAZARDS ENCOMPASSED BY THE 
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY 
AGREEMENT. 
Harrison specifically contends in her Brief of Appellant that the 
Kelease Agreement signed by Plaintiff does not bar her claim against 
Defendant because the actions of Free Spirit Recreation's employees 
in negligently instructing Plaintiff on where to put her hands during 
the jump was not a foreseeable and known risk which Plaintiff 
assumed in signing the release. Brief of Appellant at 5. Plaintiff 
further contends that the injury to her hands was not a risk which 
she had knowledge of in executing the Release Agreement. Id. 
Contrary to Harrison's contentions, the negligent acts of Free 
Spirit's employees and the injury to Harrison's hands are clearly 
hazards encompassed by the language of the Release Agreement. 
The first paragraph of the Agreement states as follows: "I am hereby 
aware that shock cord jumping . . . is a hazardous activity and I am 
voluntarily participating in this activity with full knowledge of the 
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danger involved and hereby agree to accept any and all risk of injury 
or death. (Please initial) [Harrison's initials]." Assumption of Risk 
and Release of Liability 1 1, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). 
In the second paragraph, the Agreement states that the signer "shall 
not make a claim against, sue, attach the property of, or prosecute 
Free Spirit Recreation for injury or damage . . . ."Id. % 2, Exhibit 
"D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The second paragraph further 
provides that Harrison releases and discharges the company from all 
actions "for injury or damage resulting from my participation in 
shock cord jumping activities. (Please initial) [Harrison's initials]" 
Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The third paragraph of 
the Release Agreement states that Harrison will "HOLD 
HARMLESS the Christensen Corp. for any claims in the event of 
any injuries, or damages as a result of my participation in shock 
cord jumping activities." (Please initial) [Harrison's initials.]" Id. 1 
3, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). 
Nowhere does the Release Agreement limit the assumed risks 
to only certain injuries as Harrison argues. To the contrary, the 
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above referenced language makes clear that there are many injuries 
that could result from bungee jumping and Free Spirit will be 
released from liability for any injury or damage arising from the 
activity. Id. f 1, 2 and 3. Exhibit "D"; R. 25. 
Harrison cites to paragraph 4 of the Release Agreement as 
support for her contention that the known risks of injury are limited 
to back or neck strain. Appellant's Brief at 6. This paragraph, 
however, is not intended to set forth a list of injuries that may result 
from bungee jumping. Rather, the provision in paragraph 4 requires 
the participant to acknowledge that he is in good physical condition 
and to notify Free Spirit of any physical impairments. Assumption 
of Risk and Release of Liability 1 4, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. As an 
example of some of the impairments which should be disclosed, the 
Agreement lists heart problems, back and neck problems, SI joint, 
pelvis, eye surgery, etc. IcL, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The "etc." 
signifies that this is not an exhaustive list and that there could be 
many more impairments to be concerned about in this type of 
hazardous activity. Paragraph 4 of the Release Agreement is 
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consistent with the rest of the release in notifying the signer that 
shock cord jumping is a hazardous activity, which requires the 
participant to be in good overall physical condition to participate. 
In addition, the negligent acts of Free Spirit's employees is a 
risk that is expressly set forth in the Release Agreement. Paragraph 
2 of the Agreement states in unambiguous terms that "I hereby agree 
that I . . . shall not make a claim against . . . Free Spirit Recreation 
for injury or damage resulting from the negligence or other acts 
however caused by any employees, agent, or contractor of Free 
Spirit Recreation as a result of my participation in shock cord 
jumping." Id. 1f 2, Exhibit "D"; R. 25 (emphasis added). The 
language could not be more clear. The alleged negligence of Free 
Spirit's employees in instructing Harrison on where to put her hands 
during the jump is clearly within the scope of the Release 
Agreement. Harrison agreed to release Free Spirit for her injury 
however caused, including an injury caused by the negligent 
instruction of a patron by an employee in the use of the bungee 
jumping harness and cord. Id., Exhibit "D"; R. 25. 
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Harrison would have the Court believe that the Release 
Agreement is invalid unless it lists every injury that could possibly 
occur to a bungee jump participant and every conceivable means by 
which an injury could occur. Brief of Appellant at 5-6. Contrary to 
Harrison's arguments, it is not necessary that the releasing party 
have specific knowledge of every injury that may occur from the 
activity or every means by which the injury may occur in order for 
the release of liability to be enforceable. As the court of appeals in 
Florida recently held: "for a release to be effective, it is not 
necessary to list each possible class of releasor or each possible 
manner in which a releasor could be injured during an inherently 
dangerous event. The possibilities are endless." DeBoer v. Florida 
Offroaders Driver's Ass'n. Inc.. 622 So.2d 1134, 1136 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1993). 
In the case of Boyce v. West. 862 P.2d 592 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1993), an opinion cited earlier in this Brief, the plaintiff made the 
same arguments as Harrison makes in the present case in an attempt 
to void a release of liability agreement in favor of the defendants. 
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The Boyce case involved a wrongful death action brought by the 
plaintiff on behalf of her son who died during a scuba diving 
accident while taking scuba lessons as part of a college course at 
Gonzaga University. The personal representative of the decedent 
alleged that the negligence of the diving instructor, James West, 
caused the wrongful death. Plaintiff named as defendants both Mr. 
West and Gonzaga University. 
Before taking the scuba lessons, the decedent signed a release 
of liability and assumption of risk agreement.2 The defendants in 
2 The release of liability and assumption of risk provisions at issue in 
Boyce read in part as follows: 
I understand and agree that neither . . . Gonzaga 
University . . . nor [PADI] may be held liable in any way for 
any occurrence in connection with this diving class that may 
result in injury, death, or other damages to me or my family, 
heirs, or assigns, . . . and further to save and hold harmless 
said program and persons from any claim by me, or my 
family, estate, heirs, or assigns, arising out of my enrollment 
and participation in this course. 
It is the intention of [Peter Boyce] by this instrument to 
exempt and release [Gonzaga University] and [PADI] from all 
liability whatsoever for personal injury, property damage or 
wrongful death caused by negligence. 
(continued...) 
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Boyce moved for summary judgment on the basis that the release 
agreement precluded plaintiff from recovery. The trial court agreed 
and granted the summary judgment motion. On appeal, plaintiff 
argued, as Harrison does in her Brief of Appellant, that the release 
of liability agreement only barred recovery for injuries resulting 
from "known risks voluntarily assumed" and that in signing the 
release the decedent did not know or assume the risk of negligent 
instruction and supervision by the scuba instructor, Mr. West. 
Boyce. 862 P.2d at 597. 
In affirming the trial court's ruling on defendant's summary 
judgment motion, the Boyce Court held that "Mr. Boyce's express 
assumption of all risks associated with his enrollment in the scuba 
diving course bars a claim for recovery." Id. at 598 (citing W. 
Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on 
2(... continued) 
[I]n consideration of being allowed to enroll in this 
course, I hereby personally assume all risks in connection with 
said course, for any harm, injury or damage that may befall 
me while I am enrolled as a student of the course, including all 
risks connected therewith . . . . 
Boyce, 862 P.2d 595 n. 2 & 3. 
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Torts § 68, at 484 (5th ed. 1984)). In arriving at its decision, the 
court reasoned that '"knowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary 
when there is an express agreement to assume all risk; by express 
agreement a "plaintiff may undertake to assume all of the risks of a 
particular . . . situation, whether they are known or unknown to 
him.'"" Id. at 598 (quoting Madison v. Superior Court. 250 Cal. 
Rptr. 299 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming. 
Inc^, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (Cal. 1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original))). The court then held: 
[negligent instruction and supervision are clearly risks 
associated with being a student in a scuba diving course 
and are encompassed by the broad language of the 
contract. That Mr. Boyce [decedent] may not have 
specifically considered the possibility of instructor 
negligence when he signed the release does not invalidate 
his express assumption of all risks associated with his 
participation in the course. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
The same is true in this case. It is not necessary that Harrison 
have knowledge of a particular act of negligence or a particular 
injury when she made an express agreement to assume all risks of 
injury or damage and release Free Spirit from all liability. In 
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executing the Release Agreement, Harrison agreed to assume "any 
and all risk of injury or death" associated with the shock cord 
jumping activity. Assumption of Risk and Release of Liability t 1, 
Exhibit "D"; R. 25. The negligent acts of Free Spirit's employees 
and the injury to Harrison's hands are clearly hazards encompassed 
by the language of the Release Agreement. This Agreement operates 
as a complete bar to Harrison's claims against Free Spirit, and, 
accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed Harrison's action 
against Free Spirit. 
IV. 
THE RELEASE AGREEMENT IS NOT 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
A. Agreements Which Exempt a Recreational Facility from 
Liability for Its Own Negligence Are Valid and Enforceable 
Under the Law. 
Harrison next contends in her Brief that the Release Agreement 
is unconscionable because it absolves Free Spirit of liability as a 
result of its own negligence. Brief of Appellant at 6-7. In making 
this argument, Harrison fails to cite to any legal authority in support 
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of her position and ignores the authority which holds that agreements 
purporting to limit one's liability for negligence are enforceable. 
As mentioned previously, the Wyoming Supreme Court held 
that " [e]xculpatory agreements, releasing parties from negligence 
liability for damages or injury, are valid and enforceable . . . ." 
Milligan. 754 P.2d at 1065. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that "[i]n Missouri an agreement to exempt one from the 
consequences of negligence is not against public policy." Haines v. 
St. Charles Speedway. Inc.. 874 F.2d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 1988). 
Other jurisdictions have arrived at this same conclusion. DeBoer. 
622 So.2d 1134; Boyce. 862 P.2d 592; LaFrenz v. Lake County 
Fair Bd.. 360 N.E.2d 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).3 
The Utah Appellate Courts have similarly held that agreements 
which obligate one party to assume responsibility for the negligence 
of another are enforceable. Walker Bank & Trust Co.. 341 P.2d 
944; Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 
1187 (Utah 1983); Freund, 793 P.2d 362; Healev. 892 P.2d 1047. 
3 See other opinions cited on page 15 of this Brief. 
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The Utah Supreme Court held that "an indemnity agreement which 
purports to make a party respond for the negligence of another" is 
enforceable when that intention is "'clearly and unequivocally 
expressed.'" Freund. 793 P.2d at 370 (quoting Shell Oil Co.. 658 
P.2dat 1189). 
Here, the intent to release Free Spirit from any liability as a 
result of Harrison's participation in the bungee jump activity is 
clearly expressed and easily comprehended in the Release 
Agreement. In addition to signing the Release Agreement, Harrison 
initialled the agreement in 7 other places signifying that she had 
read, comprehended, and agreed to the provisions. Assumption of 
Risk and Release of Liability, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. 
B. The Release Agreement was Fairly Negotiated. 
Harrison does not allege, nor can she assert, that the agreement 
was unfairly negotiated. As previously mentioned, the Release 
Agreement is comprehensible and Harrison signed and initialled the 
agreement in 8 different places. Assumption of Risk and Release of 
Liability, Exhibit "D"; R. 25. There is no evidence or allegation 
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that Harrison was pressured into signing the Agreement or that she 
didn't have adequate opportunity to review the Agreement. Harrison 
had the choice of whether to participate in the activity and could 
have chosen not to participate.4 Bungee jumping does not involve 
an essential activity such as contracting with a utility company or a 
hospital, where the plaintiff has no reasonable alternative but to use 
the product or service.5 
Harrison otherwise fails to show that the Release Agreement is 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. Consequently, 
Harrison's argument in this regard must fail and the trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed. 
4 See DeBoer. 622 So.2d at 1136 (there is no inequality of 
bargaining power in recreational settings where the releasor voluntarily 
participates in the activity). 
5 See Milligan. 754 P.2d at 1067 ("Grand Targhee [defendant] did 
not force Dean Griffin [decedent] to ski in the race. Griffin could have 
chosen not to race. Skiing in the race was not a matter of practical 
necessity for the public, and putting on the race was not an essential 
service. Nor was skiing in the race the only reasonable alternative. Thus, 
no decisive bargaining advantage or disadvantage existed. Further, no 
evidence suggests that the decedent was unfairly pressured into signing the 
agreement or that he was deprived of an opportunity to understand its 
implications."). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant and Appellee, Free Spirit 
Recreation, Inc., respectfully requests that the Order of the trial 
court granting Free Spirit's Motion to Dismiss be affirmed, the 
appeal of Harrison be dismissed, and Free Spirit be awarded its costs 
on appeal. 
./ 
DATED this J1Y day of January, 1996. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Mitchel T. Rice 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Free Spirit Recreation, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^ / day of January, 1996, I caused 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Ronald E. Dalby, Esq. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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35 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
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court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a S300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
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Civil No. 950901694 PI 
JUDGE Si \ NDR A N PEI II ER 
ge£o r e ^ c o u r t j s defendant Free Spirit Recreation Incorporated's Motion to Dismiss 
plaintiffs complaint based upon Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules o ^ a .ocedure. The court 
ha \ ing review eci the pljeajii ngs filed in th is matter and pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the U'tahCode 
of Judicial Administration now enters the following ruling. 
, r v - ^ matter based upon 
the Release of Liability Agreement signed by plaintiff, Fhe agreement operates as a bar to 
plainti * t. 
f
 * Counse. ^ directed .- rare an order consistent with this ruling. 
.oJ&J-C* 
Sandra N. Peuler, 
District Court. Judge 
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Stephen G. Morgan 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STAFF OF UTAH 
JEANNiL HARRISON. 
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vs. 
kilE SPIRIT RECREATION. INC., 
; THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 950901694 PI 
Judge Sandra N. Peuler 
This matter came before the Court < . • i • -fondant Free Spirit Recreation, Inc.'s Motion 
to Plaintiffs Complair " uiew j . oiurev appearing as 
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IT IS ORDERED FUA 
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ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND RELEASE OF LIABILITY 
I am hereby aware that shock cord jumping (commonly referred to a* "Bungee Jumping") is. a hazardous activity and \ am 
voluntarily participating in thisac^viy^tltfull knowledge of the danger involved and hereby agree to accept any and ail tltk 
of injury or death. (Please in i t ia l )^K£J£& 
As lawful consideration for being permitted by<£rge Spirit Recreationjo participate in these activities and rent their 
equipment I hereby agrae that I, my heirs, dlstrlbules^guardlans, legal representatives, and assigned shall not make a claim 
against, sua,attacti the property of, or prosecute Free Spirit Recreation for injury of damage resulting from the negligence or 
other acts however caused by any employees, agent or contractor of FreeSpirit ftecrsai^aaa^reault of my participation in 
shock cord jumping. In addition, I hereby release and discharge the company Upif^Sc^slclkms, or demands that I, my 
heirs, distributee, guardians, legal representatives, or assigned now have owTifiOpra ajjffi hive for Injury or damage 
resulting from my participation in shock cord jumpino^ivJljfflS) (glsajgjnipl) S ^ ^ S S S H H r 
I hereby state that I will HOLD HARMLESS the *V*m:i*mva^^ tor any claims 
in the event ot y y ^ u j f ^ or damages as a result of my participation in shock^c&rtfjurtfping activities. 
(Please Initial) j 
I am Jn good physical health or have notified Free Spirit Recreation of any physical impairments, or limitations (le.; history oJ 
any heart or back and neck problems, St Joint, pelvis, aye a u r g ^ etjy thj^may atfect my physical and mental^ wal^ being' 
during or after shock cord jumping activities. (Please initial) J 
I hereby declare that 1 am not under the influence of drugt o^lcchoi and am of sound mind. (Please Iniftaf) 
I hereby declare that I am 18 years of age or older, (Please initial) | 
AGE VERIFICATION 
Drivers Ucanse/t.D. No. te^CTfa*^^ " 
Date of Birth %£ 
*r9&ttimmpmm 
ra^sa^ 
- i i i i Age v$fam 
Verified fay TO^&ggg '• -g*:*ffY^^^ 
(Signature of Employee or Agent of Free Spirit Recreation) 
I hereby dectare that I am the legal parent/guardian of applicant and give my permission for his/her participation, I wilf 
assume full responsibility as stated in this contract 
Parent/Guardian Signature Mr'X^^mi^mm^^^^ ••^•ffiTftT^^ 
I have carefully read this agreement and fully understand its contents, i am also aware that this agreement is a release of 
liability and a contra&Wtomen myseif and Free Spirit Recreation. I am signing this waiver and agreements my own free 
wilLtPleasslnittaOSg^gC^Li 
APPLICANT SIGNATURE; 
WTTN6SS SIGNATURE: VVW / • • tc«v "•'•7:v7r"*' r ?•&:•* ~rw 
APPLICANT INFORMATION 
NAME: w4j*^M*i&Ff ^t^^'ii?^—^: • iwit^:r'H PHONE #: *i?%mttDf&3kh 
ADDRESS: l E S E fc££^ • • • T — ? \ • " * • ; - - i v , : 
STATS ?r>'-^ar^Y/jg?<«£-> -rry • "•-• • .-« 
WT.; ffijfo\l!^i AGE ffi<#-' OCCUPATION: !2s £J2 
ZIP CODE: • • ^ • # ^ ^ > ^ ' 
REFERRED B Y r ^ - S ^ ' T t ^ 
lie J m\ fclW ,*<&&• . . Vh t\r 
